The main purpose of this article is to investigate why people resort to violence against their spouses using Agnew's General Theory of Crime (domains of life). The research method employed was descriptive-correlational. A sample of 450 married men and women, drawn from individuals referring to family courts, welfare centers, and the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee in Rasht city, was investigated using the available sampling method and assumptions based on the General Theory of Crime. The scales used in the research included violence against spouse, constrains against Crime, motivation for Crime, personal, family, family, and occupational problem-causing domains The summary of the indirect coefficients of the model shows that the problematic peer domain (beta coefficient: 0.073), the problematic personal domain (beta coefficient: 0.085), the problematic family domain (beta coefficient: 0.101) and the problematic occupational domain (Beta coefficient: 0.083) by affecting the constrains against Crime and motivation for Crime indirectly affect violence against spouse. The four problematic life domains, motivation for Crime and constrains against Crime, as well as demographic variables are able to 58 explain the percentage of the variance of violence against the spouse. Also, the problematic domains of life are able to explain 21% of the variance of the constrains against Crime and 25% of the variance of the motivation for Crime.

The purpose of this paper is to philosophically address the issue of managerial opportunism and to describe the paradox of the opportunistic executive, particularly when the CEO could be considered as a “ criminal-to-be” . Also, It will be seen to what extent governance mechanisms really contribute to prevent managerial opportunism, particularly through compensation packages (“ financial carrots” ). Then, Oliver Williamson’ s viewpoint will be analyzed on opportunism, as his Theory has largely influenced the way agency theories actually define managerial opportunism. The gap in exploring three basic types of opportunism (the Smithian egoist, the Hobbesian egoist and the Machiavellian egoist) will be filled. The results indicate that The Smithian egoist tries to reach equilibrium between self-interest and compassion, while the Hobbesian egoist is motivated by self-interest, desire of power and the attitude of prudence. The Machiavellian egoist is always searching for power and makes followers’ fear arising. The way governance mechanisms and structures should be designed and implemented could be quite different if the CEO actually behaves as a Smithian, Hobbesian or Machiavellian egoist. CEO’ s propensity to commit financial Crime could largely vary from one type to another: low risk (Smithian egoist), medium risk (Hobbesian egoist) or high risk (Machiavellian egoist). Smith’ s, Hobbes’ and Machiavelli’ s philosophy was chosen because the agency Theory sometimes refers to it, when defining the notion of opportunism. Other philosophies could also be analyzed to see to what extent they are opening the door to opportunism (for example, Spinoza).

Travis Hirschi and Michelle Gottfredon, in justifying how Crime was committed, first articulated the Theory of social control and then the General Theory of Crime. According to these two theories, people who have committed a Crime, or at least the rate of Crime committed by them, is very small, which is defined by four constraints, which are: Involvement, Correlation, Commitment and Belief to be controlled. Then, with the development of this Theory, they came to the conclusion that in addition to the above four constraints, it is necessary to motivate and institutionalize self-control in childhood and mainly from 7 to 12 years old by proper upbringing and various teachings in children. Preparing forms based on the above theories and conducting interviews with about 600 people sentenced to imprisonment in various Crimes in Kermanshah and Evin Tehran Central Prisons as a scientific solution to determine the extent of the impact of these theories is the subject of this study.

One of the factors that can be the link between our intentions and actions and their external consequences is human agency, which indicates the conscious design and intentional execution of actions by the individual in order to influence future events.Objective and Method: This research with a developmental approach of psychometric method and method 1, examines the psychometric indices of the Human Factor Characteristics Scale using the classical Theory of test score measurement and the graduated question-answer Theory. The purpose of this study, which included high school students in Tehran, was selected by cluster sampling of 500 people as a sample size and statistical analysis was performed on 481 data. To collect the data, the ion Human Agent Characteristics Scale (2011) was used and the research questions were evaluated using IRTPRO and SPSS software.Results:The assumption of local independence based on Pearson x2 index was established by applying Simjima's calibrated question-answer Theory and the assumption of being one-dimensional based on the analysis of multidimensional question-answer Theory. Diagnosis parameters with question-answer approach and classical approach Test score Both item 25 approach had the lowest and item 2 had the highest diagnosis parameter. The answer thresholds for all the questions were so far apart that no option was covered by the other option, and the options were independently selected by individuals at intervals of theta. The total scale was calculated with Cronbach's alpha of 0.945, intentionality of 0.894, foresight of 0.780, self-reactivity of 0.871 and rethinking of 0.762. Also, the role of each item in internal consistency was investigated by the loop method, which all questions had a favorable role in internal consistency of this scale. The value of the validity coefficient obtained from the question-answer Theory was obtained by marginal method for intentionality 0.92, forethought 0.85, self-reaction 0.91, rethinking 0.83..

The Theory of Crime prevention through environmental design is based on one simple idea -- that Crime results partly from the opportunities presented by physical environment. This being the case it should be possible to alter the physical environment so that Crime is less likely to occur. Simple, almost obvious as this may be, the idea that Crime is partly caused by physical environment has been a controversial one among criminologists. In my presentation I will argue that the controversy is based on a misunderstanding about causes and will review what is now a large body of evidence that the physical environment plays an important part in Crime. I will then review current approaches to changing the physical environment and the “opportunity” theories on which these rest. I will also consider the main criticism of environmental Crime prevention that it does not reduce Crime, but merely displaces it to some othertime, place or target. Finally, I will draw out the main lessons from research about successful ways to implement Crime prevention through environmental design.

Qassāma (Arabic: اَلْقَسّامَة, lit.: compurgation, tribal oath consists of 50 men of the tribe swearing to being right) is one of the types of evidence in substantiation of criminal claims that is specific to Crimes. Among jurists, there is a difference of opinion about the possibility of punishing the perpetrator in terms of the General aspect of the Crime, assuming that the principle of intentional Crime is proved through qassāma. Some have not differentiated between qassāma and other evidence, considering it possible. Some have also considered the punishment of the perpetrator to be contrary to the principle of innocence (Arabic: أصالَةُ الْبَرائَة, lit.: presumption of innocence) and to be in favor of the defendant. This difference of opinion has led to the issuance of a unified legal opinion (uniform judicial precedent), stating that it is not possible to prove the General aspect of the Crime in this case. The present research, using a descriptive-analytical method and a critique of existing views, states that the legislator considers the legal consequences of intentional behavior in cases of establishing criminal liability for the offender, without differentiating between qassāma and other evidence. One of these consequences is the taʿzīr (Arabic: اَلْتَّعْزیر, lit.: discretionary punishment) prescribed for Crimes against oneself in cases of obstruction of qiṣāṣ (Arabic: قِصَاص, lit. “accountability, pursuing, or prosecuting”), as mentioned in Articles 612 and 614 of the Penal Code. The absoluteness (Arabic: إطْلاق) of these articles also confirms the absence of the aforementioned difference. Therefore, it is possible to prove the General aspect of the Crime regardless of the type of probative proof. The proof of this aspect is not based on the evidence for qassāma; rather, it relies on considerations such as the legislator’s expediency in establishing the public aspect of the Crime in intentional offenses and the repercussions on the perpetrators of these Crimes.

Explaining new phenomena and events in various fields using macro and interdisciplinary theories and strategies is on of the practical tools for better understanding of these phenomena in order to adopt appropriate management-executive approaches to them. Therefore, understanding the concept of "Sovernment Crime" as a systematic violation of citizens' rights by the government, under "Game Theory" as one of the strategic theories to explain phenomena and events in the fields of social sciences and international relations, is a matter that is both from the perspective of understanding and promotion. The so-called government Crime literature is worthy of attention in terms of attention to the objective and practical aspects of identifying and responding to government Crimes. Therefore, in this article, considering the state and citizens as two main actors in different fields, and using the principles and elements of game Theory, it has been argued that the actors participating in a game have rationality and by calculating their possible profit and loss participate in the game process and seek maximum profit and minimum loss. These actors reach equilibrium at a point known as the saddle point - in which each actor has gained a certain amount of profit and loss. This point is the point where it is no longer possible to receive more profit and less loss for any of the parties, and if the game continues, they will suffer a decrease in profit and an increase in loss. Finally, it has been concluded that the states, with tools such as bringing other actors into their playing field with citizens, using rents and information tools, changing the rules and regulations governing the game, cause the balance to be disturbed and the saddle point to be shifted to turned towards themselves and thus cause systematic violation of citizens' rights.